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INTRODUCTION
In Technology and the Virtues,' Shannon Vallor develops an approach to the ethics of
technology rooted in a comparison of Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist theories of
moral virtue. She argues that "technologies invite or afford specific patterns of thought,
behavior, and valuing; they open up new possibilities for human action and foreclose or
obscure others."2 Sometimes, this is done explicitly and sometimes it is implicit. Consider,
for example, the practice of human-centered design thinking, which is an iterative process
for product design that places high value on user experience. The resulting products and
services are shaped by the designer's understanding of what constitutes a human need or
want, typically derived through an ethnographical study of human behavior. Major
technology companies, including Google and Apple, use design thinking to improve
customer satisfaction. Technology can also have unintended effects on human satisfaction
by creating habits or traits that help or hinder human behavior and character. For example,
using computer screens has displaced paper as the preferred means for delivering reading
materials, with the unintended effects of decreasing the reader's engagement with text and
promoting interruption and distraction. Vallor develops the neologism, "technomoral," to
* Professor of Law, Campbell University, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law.
1 SHANNON VALLOR, TECHNOLOGY AND THE VIRTUES, A PHILOSOPHICAL GUIDE TO A FUTURE WORTH
WANTING (2018).
2 Id. at 2.
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refer to the intended and unintended consequences of technology on the ability of humans
to have fulfilled lives.
If this conception of the technomoral is correct, what virtues ought technology promote?
How ought morally responsible decisions be made about technology? This is urgently
needed since the NBIC (nano, bio, information, and cognitive) technologies hold the
potential to unleash existential crises and radically transformative social changes? They
present complex moral dilemmas that quickly exhaust the resources of standard policy
debates and contribute to an increasingly "disordered geopolitics and widening fractures
in the public commons."' Vallor argues that moral assessment of the technology cannot
be achieved through the deontological and utilitarian ethics, which view moral reasoning
in terms of discursive calculations within a field of moral possibilities. Thus, although these
forms of moral reasoning dominate in public policy today, they become overwhelmed by
rapid changes in social meaning because they lack resources for imagining the state of
persistent change, characteristic of technology today. The alternative developed in
Technology and the Virtues is to look comparatively to broadly diverse forms of practical
reasoning-Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist-to determine a minimal set of core
principles that define the structure of thinking about the good. These common principles
she argues can be the basis for a virtue ethics (which she calls "technomoral wisdom")
that might describe common commitments to the common practices of the emerging
global information society.
3 Id. at 5.
4 Id. at 154.
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I. DESCRIPTION OF THE BOOK
The book is divided into three parts: Part I is a metaphilosophical assessment. It advocates
for a virtue ethics approach to assessing technology. Virtue (Latin), arete (Greek), and de
(Chinese) refer to similar conceptualizations of assessing moral character, given excellent
human function (ergon). These ancient approaches to moral reasoning have been the
object of renewed interest in contemporary moral philosophy. This interest was furthered
by the works of Elizabeth Anscombe, who called for a renewal in her classic essay
"Modern Moral Philosophy."' Anscombe argued that deontological ethics rely, ultimately,
on some conception of divine duty and therefore ought to be dropped in the modem
discourse for a robust moral psychology. Vallor accepts that deontology ought to be
dropped but establishes her claim by considering features of practical reason that exist
across cultures in the Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist practices of moral reasoning.
Drawing from what she takes to be the acceptable aspects of these ancient traditions, she
argues for a common ground. Four common commitments emerge from her analysis: (1)
a belief there can be a common conception of the moral good (although the nature of the
common good is contested); (2) a common understanding that virtues achieve the
common good; (3) the belief that moral virtues are the habits of good character; and (4) a
belief that the moral life depends on some understanding of moral anthropology (the
human as a moral being.)8 Vallor argues, following Alasdair MacIntyre, that virtues are
understood and taught through particular practices and narratives of a tradition. She
s Id. at 36-37.
6 G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in VIRTUE ETHICS 26-44 (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote
eds.,1998).
7 VALLOR, supra note 1, at 36-42.
8 Id. at 109-110.
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suggests there is an emerging global technological tradition, with its own narratives and
practices, upon which a technomoral virtue ethics might be founded.'
Part II further develops the theoretical foundations for her virtue ethics. She begins by
defending comparative studies of virtue, in which she is engaged, and stressing the
cultivation of the moral self through habituation. She finds similarities among the
Confucians, Buddhists and Aristotelians in their understanding of this process through
examination of the moral lives of exemplars and the repetition of moral practices.
Common principles of moral self-cultivation involve a relational focus and a commitment
to moral self-development, which involves moral attention, practical judgement, and
extension of moral concern. In examining the three virtue traditions, she identifies twelve
specific technomoral virtues: 1. Honesty; 2. Self-control; 3. Humility; 4.Justice; 5. Courage;
6. Empathy; 7. Care; 8. Civility; 9. Flexibility; 10. Perspective;11. Magnanimity; 12.
Technomoral Wisdom. 0
Part III applies Vallor's conception of technomoral virtue to four types of emerging
technologies: social media, surveillance, robot weapons, and human enhancement. Social
media are a new context in which human relations take place." The nature and quality of
the relations needs careful scrutiny for the challenges and opportunities to enrich human
flourishing. Although she laments that social media cultivate many practices that are
counter-productive to the virtues she has identified, she remains hopeful. She concludes
9 She believes a "family resemblance" exists among the traditions of moral reasoning that she is examining.
She writes:
This family resemblance can be articulated as a framework for the practice of moral self-
cultivation, with seven core elements: moral habituation, relational understanding,
reflective self-examination, intentional self-direction of moral development, moral
attention, prudential judgement, and the appropriate extension of moral concern."
Id. at 118.
10 Id. at 120.
1 Vallor writes, "the distinctive feature of Web 2.0 is that it is users who create and share the vast majority
of its content...." Id at 160.
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that the social media have displaced older venues for social engagement without replacing
them. This has led to some degradation in social-political relation, and yet there are
untapped resources in social media that could be developed. 2 Next, she looks to
surveillance and the ethics of privacy. She accepts that the emerging surveillance
technologies will not be constrained by cultural or legal controls., privacy will be absent
like it is in Bentham's Panopticon. She hopes that the inevitable surveillance will provide
opportunities for self-cultivation. Citing the Quantified Self movement, she suggests that
surveillance might offer opportunities to use increased understanding of human behavior
to achieve better self-awareness and non-coercive measure of social control through
"nudges"." The third technology is robotic weapons. Here she notes that robot ethics
typically takes either utilitarian or deontological forms. It rarely engages virtue ethics,
which can help to articulate goods sought by the technology. In this regard, robot ethics
engages the values of hope, courage, and self-care. These devices also have radically
transformative possibilities for social relations and self-understanding. Vallor argues
persuasively that virtue discourse will be essential to navigating them. Finally, she looks at
technologies for human enhancement, which directly pose questions about imagining
fulfilled human lives. What virtues would humans need to have in order to responsibly
meet this challenge? 4 Citing Nietzsche, she questions, if the enhancements should free us
from human maladies, then what purpose are we free for?' To know the answers to these
questions will require steady commitment to cultivating the practices and habits of moral
virtue.
12 She writes, "New social media and the broader Web have yet to fill the moral vacuum left by the
traditional venues whose departure they hastened." Id. at 187.
13 Id. at 202-204.
14 Id. at 231.
15 Id. at 241.
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2. ANALYSIS
Vallor's work well deserves the many accolades it has received. Her argument for a virtue
ethics approach to understanding the moral issues posed by technology is persuasive and
compelling. The clarity of the need for a recovery of virtue that Elizabeth Anscombe
contended over fifty years ago has only grown. Anscombe contended that deontological
and rational choice approaches lack the resources for dealing with the complexity of
contemporary issues. Over the intervening years, the complexity of the issues has grown,
driven in no small degree by the radical alterations to society brought about by developing
new technologies and the scientific concepts that make them possible. Anscombe believed
at the time that the recovery of virtue ethics was premature, that it waited on developing
a robust science of moral psychology. But to a large degree, that development has
happened. Aided by technology, moral psychology today is a well-established field that
presents many difficult moral issues of its own. Vallor's contribution to virtue ethics is
therefore timely and valuable.
Despite its many insights, the project she initiates in this work might be extended in three
ways. First, it might be useful to engage the ethics of information, which has been pursued
through a deontic approach. Vallor, who claims that deontic ethics are inadequate for the
times, should take on Floridi's deontic ethics of information, which is the most influential
ethics of technology. There appears to be much to gain from this engagement since both
touch on very similar topics but perceive the issues in original ways. Second, Vallor might
consider incorporating Platonic conceptions of virtue as they developed in the West. There
are several advantages to this, particularly if one considers the relation between Christian
Neo-Platonism and Eastern thought in contemporary understanding.' The concept of
16 For a discussion of the relation between Christian Platonism and Eastern thought, see JOHN COBB,
BEYOND DIALOGUE, TOWARD A MUTUAL TRANSFORMATION OF CHRISTIANITY AND BUDDHISM, (1998).
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"change" which is found as a primary ontological category in Confucian and Mahayana
Buddhism is also found in Heraclitus and Plato. These conceptions were taken up by
Christian Neo-Platonists, such as Denys the Areopogite, Augustine of Hippo, and
Bonaventure, to describe the relation between the observable world characterized by
change, and the Christian commitment to an eternal, unchanging God who created all
things. The similarity between Christian Neo-Platonism and Eastern thought was a well-
spring for contemplative Christian thought and practices in the twentieth century with
figures like Thomas Merton and D.T. Suzuki." Vallor's project might benefit from
exploring the significance of these important aspects of Western thought, if only to
demonstrate the universality of these experiences and to blunt the artificial divisions
between East and West.
Relatedly, the project might benefit from engaging more directly with the implications for
politics. By more directly addressing the political, the project might better display its
resources for criticizing the dominant neoliberalism. The open-ended description of virtue
that Vallor develops rejects a comprehensive metaphysically teleological conception of
human function (ergon) that was typical of the Aristotelian virtue ethics. In this respect, she
follows modern thought. She adopts MacIntyre's conception of virtue as a practice, which
is a formal conception of virtue without a specific conception of human flourishing, but a
reasonable process by which a fulfilled life might be pursued. Vallor seems to suggest this
process is a political one in the sense that it involves being engaged in a public life and in
a private one. Aristotle argues that humans are by nature social. They seek friendship and
establish households. There are public virtues, such as courage and temperance, and there
are the private virtues of the householder.
See also, Joel J. Kupperman, Naturalness Revisited, Why Western Philosophers Should Studj Confudus, in
CONFUCIUS AND THE ANALECTS (Bryan W. Van Norden ed., 2002).
17 See, e.g., THOMAS MERTON, ZEN AND THE BIRDS OF APPETITE (2010); and D. T. SUZUKI, MYSTICISM,
CHRISTIAN AND BUDDHIST (2005).
(2019)J.JURIS. 235
THEJOURNALJURISPRUDENCE
Chinese thought distinguishes between the public rituals and the private practices.'8 But,
the nature of the relation of public and private is not articulated in Vallor's work. Does
she imagine the polis as ruled by virtuous kings whose cultivation of the virtues allows
them a means to wisely use technology so they might rule like the ancient Chinese
Emperors, whose authority rested on the Mandate of Heaven?" Or, perhaps, an
Aristotelian judge who has cultivated moral perfection to such a high degree that all
subordinate virtues can be seen transparently. These elitist views of politics portend
dystopian authoritarian forms of government, with a technomoral intelligentsia wielding
unlimited authority to protect society from the dangers of the technology they themselves
have created. Or, will it be an oligopoly, with a ruling class composed of the masters of
tech giants? Does the technomoral have resources that restore a robust liberal democracy?
Can it resist the totalizing neoliberalism by conceiving the good?
III. CONCLUSION
Ethical analysis of technology is sorely needed. The new technologies are dramatically
powerful forces shaping society and our environment. To address these developments
challenge us to think seriously about issues of rights and duty, but as Vallor rightly points
out, the new technologies call us to reflect on the goals and purposes that we agree to
pursue together. Near the end of the book Vallor cites Ortega y Gusset to point out that
the technomoral crisis comes from the "'appalling restlessness' that manifests itself in
18 See, Christina B. Whitman, Privag in Confudan and Taoist Thought, in INDIVIDUALISM AND HOLISM:
STUDIES IN CONFUCIAN AND TAOIST VALUES, (D. Munro ed.) 1985.
19 For an account of the Mandate of Heaven, see generaly, YONGLINJIANG, THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN
(2013).
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frenzied but directionless seeking." 20 This dissipating restlessness may find a distinct home
in American culture, which is steeped deeply in this rugged individualism-the blind
passion for more that lies like the light at the end of Daisy Buchanan's pier in F. Scott
Fitzgerald's novel The Great Gatsby, and like Gatsby we believe that "if we run a little faster
and stretch our arms out a little farther, then one fine day...."2 1 Or consider the restless
spirit of the American West that Wallace Stagner captures so well in his novel, The B Rock
Cany Mountain: Always moving on, always looking for the next gold rush.22 What Vallor
has written is a hopeful, yet clear-eyed assessment of our ability to meet the awful challenge
of facing the future with a faithful commitment to a morally meaningful and satisfying
existence.
20 Vallor supra note 1, at 248.
21 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY, 185 (2003).
22 WALLACE STEGNER, THE BIG ROCK CANDY MOUNTAIN (2017).
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